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REDEFINING REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND
JUSTICE
Leah Litman*
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND JUSTICE STORIES. Edited by Melissa
Murray, Katherine Shaw and Reva B. Siegel. Foundation Press. 2019.
Pp. 265. $54.
INTRODUCTION
The 2016 presidential election was a critical moment for reproductive
rights and justice. The Republican Party platform promised Supreme Court
“appointments [that] will enable courts to begin to reverse the long line of
activist decisions – including Roe[v. Wade],”1 the case holding that women
have a fundamental right to decide whether to end their pregnancies.2 Dur-
ing a debate, then-Republican-candidate Donald Trump announced that he
would “put[] pro-life justices on the court” so that overturning Roe would
“happen, automatically.”3 And when pressed about his stance on abortion,
Trump said that there should be “some form of punishment” for women
who have abortions.4 Just three years into his presidency, Donald Trump has
had two Supreme Court appointments.5
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Sam Ba-
genstos, Daniel Deacon, Don Herzog, Melissa Murray, and Reva Siegel for helpful comments
and conversations. Thanks to Allyssa Scheyer (UCI Law, class of 2020) and Amruta Trivedi
(UCI Law, class of 2021) for research assistance.
1. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, at 10 (2016),
https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben
_1468872234.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY4U-62KT].
2. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), affirmed the “central holding” of Roe but modified the le-
gal framework governing abortion restrictions.
3. NBC News, The Third Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump (Full
Debate), YOUTUBE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smkyorC5qwc; see also
Ron Elving,Which Trump Should Be Believed on Overturning Roe v. Wade?, NPR (July 3, 2018,
5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/03/625410441/which-trump-should-be-believed-on-
overturning-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/N88Y-RC97]; Dan Mangan, Trump: I’ll Appoint
Supreme Court Justices to Overturn Roe v. Wade Abortion Case, CNBC (Oct. 19, 2016, 9:31
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/19/trump-ill-appoint-supreme-court-justices-to-over
turn-roe-v-wade-abortion-case.html [https://perma.cc/DN7C-3SR7].
4. Trump: ‘Some Form of Punishment’ Needed for Abortion, CNBC (Mar. 30, 2016, 3:34
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2016/03/30/trump-some-form-of-punishment-needed-for-
abortion.html; see also Tom Kertscher, In Context: Transcript of Donald Trump on Punishing
Women for Abortion, POLITIFACT WIS. (Mar. 30, 2016),
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Since taking office, the Trump administration has, to no surprise, at-
tempted to dismantle various protections for reproductive rights and justice.
The administration reinstated a broader version of the global gag rule, under
which all foreign nongovernmental organizations that provide abortions or
counsel women about abortions are ineligible to receive federal funds.6 Vice
President Pence cast a tie-breaking vote to rescind a regulation that prohibit-
ed states from excluding abortion providers from Title X, a program that
provides money to family planning services.7 The administration subse-
quently promulgated a regulation that excludes from the Title X program all
entities that perform abortions or offer referrals to abortion providers.8 The
administration promulgated another regulation that would allow employers
to opt out of the statutory requirement to provide their employees insurance
coverage for contraception.9 The Office of Refugee Resettlement has refused
to allow undocumented minor women in government custody to obtain
abortions.10 And states, perhaps sensing that the tides are changing, have en-
acted a spate of draconian restrictions.11 One of the recently enacted laws
would imprison women who obtain abortions.12
https://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2016/mar/30/context-transcript-donald-trump-
punishing-women-ab/ (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
5. Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies
.aspx [https://perma.cc/6A8X-VYKE].
6. Jessie Hellmann, Trump Reinstates Ban on US Funding for Abortion Overseas, HILL
(Jan. 23, 2017, 11:58 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/abortion/315652-trump-signs-
executive-order-reinstating-global-gag-rule-on [https://perma.cc/K2NN-93ZN]; see also Aria-
na Eunjung Cha & Carol Morello, Trump Expansion of Abortion ‘Gag Rule’ Will Restrict $8.8
Billion in U.S. Aid, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2017, 4:16 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/to-your-health/wp/2017/05/15/trump-expansion-of-abortion-gag-rule-will-restrict-8-8-
billion-in-u-s-aid/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (discussing how this restriction also
affected programs started under Republican President George W. Bush).
7. Lisa Mascaro, Pence Casts Tie-Breaking Vote to Let States Withhold Federal Funds
from Planned Parenthood, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2017, 3:45 PM), https://www.latimes.com
/politics/la-na-pol-congress-planned-parenthood-20170330-story.html [http://perma.cc/T4AT
-ZM5Z].
8. Compliance with Statutory Program Integrity Requirements, 83 Fed. Reg. 25,502
(proposed June 1, 2018) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 59), amended by 84 Fed. Reg. 7714
(Mar. 4, 2019). This regulation is currently being challenged. California v. Azar, No. 19-15974
(9th Cir.).
9. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Trump Administration Finalizes Birth Control Opt-Out
Policy, AP (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/8c90eb432f73420786de1c05da872761
[https://perma.cc/2XM7-SJCK]. This regulation is also being challenged. California v. Azar,
No. 18-15144 (9th Cir.).
10. Jeremy W. Peters, Under Trump, an Office Meant to Help Refugees Enters the Abor-
tion Wars, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/05/us/politics
/refugee-office-abortion-trump.html [http://perma.cc/8GAD-BCU7].
11. The governors in Ohio, Kentucky, Georgia, North Dakota, Louisiana, and Missis-
sippi have signed into law bills prohibiting abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected, which
can be as early as six weeks into a pregnancy. See, e.g., Sarah Mervosh, Georgia Is Latest State to
Pass Fetal Heartbeat Bill as Part of Growing Trend, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/us/georgia-fetal-heartbeat-abortion-law.html
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[https://perma.cc/AS3M-UJCN]; Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Here’s Why the Anti-Abortion
Movement Is Escalating, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 21, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com
/features/we-categorized-hundreds-of-abortion-restrictions-heres-why-the-anti-abortion-
movement-is-escalating/ [https://perma.cc/G9NU-BXUM]; see also Tara Law, Here Are the
Details of the Abortion Legislation in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana and Elsewhere, TIME (May
18, 2019), https://time.com/5591166/state-abortion-laws-explained/ [https://perma.cc/57CU-
QE7L]. Alabama Governor Kay Ivey signed a bill criminalizing performing abortions at any
stage of a pregnancy. Debbie Elliott & Laurel Wamsley, Alabama Governor Signs Abortion Ban
into Law, NPR (May 14, 2019, 10:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/14/723312937
/alabama-lawmakers-passes-abortion-ban [https://perma.cc/DZE5-M468]. Other states have
been passing laws that prohibit or severely limit access to abortion further along in the preg-
nancy. For example, Missouri governor Mike Parson signed a bill banning abortion at or after
eight weeks of pregnancy, containing no exceptions for rape or incest and making it a felony to
perform abortions in violation of that measure. See Anna North, Missouri’s 8-Week Abortion
Ban Blocked by Court, VOX (Aug. 27, 2019, 2:02 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities
/2019/5/24/18632667/missouri-abortion-ban-law-2019-bill-126 [https://perma.cc/2MR9-
GYB9]. Missouri also requires that pregnant women requesting an abortion undergo an inva-
sive pelvic exam. See Reis Thebault, Explaining the Missouri Pre-Abortion Exam Rachel
Maddow Called ‘State-Sanctioned Sexual Assault,’ WASH. POST (June 8, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2019/06/08/explaining-missouri-pre-abortion-exam-
rachel-maddow-called-state-sanctioned-sexual-assault/ (on file with the Michigan Law Re-
view).
Arkansas, Utah, Texas, North Dakota, and Indiana all passed measures in 2019 prohibit-
ing abortion at eighteen to twenty weeks, removing exceptions to existing twenty-week bans,
or proscribing procedures used in second-trimester abortions. Jessica Campisi et al., All the
States Taking Up New Abortion Laws in 2019, HILL (May 27, 2019, 3:17 PM),
https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/445460-states-passing-and-considering-new-abortion-
laws-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/Q22H-W8TP]; see also Arya Sundaram, Texas Senate Removes
Exception that Allows Abortion After 20 Weeks if the Pregnancy is Unviable, TEX. TRIB. (May 7,
2019, 7:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2019/05/07/texas-abortion-law-allowing-
procedures-after-20-weeks-removed-senate/ [https://perma.cc/D859-FUZV]. Abortion is
banned at eighteen to twenty weeks postfertilization in eighteen states. State Bans on Abortion
Throughout Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (updated Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.guttmacher
.org/state-policy/explore/state-policies-later-abortions [https://perma.cc/PB4B-KP7F].
Some commentators have noted how Kavanaugh’s confirmation “certainly influenced
many states’ decisions to pass significant restrictions on abortion contradicting existing consti-
tutional guarantees.” E.g., Helen Alvare, Symposium: Roe . . . or Wait?, SCOTUSBLOG (July 24,
2019, 2:13 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/symposium-roe-or-wait/ [https://perma
.cc/854S-YDHC].
12. A bill signed by Georgia Governor Brian Kemp prohibits abortion after the first de-
tectable heartbeat, gives fetuses “full legal recognition,” and redefines abortion as including
self-termination. H.B. 481, 155th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2019) (to be codified at Ga.
Code Ann. §§ 1-2, 16-12-5, 19-7, 31-9A, 31-9B (2020)). It therefore opens up the possibility
that a woman who self-terminates, or seeks out an abortion, could be prosecuted for murder or
another felony. Mark Joseph Stern, Georgia Just Criminalized Abortion. Women Who Termi-
nate Their Pregnancies Would Receive Life in Prison., SLATE (May 7, 2019, 2:03 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/05/hb-481-georgia-law-criminalizes-abortion-sub
jects-women-to-life-in-prison.html [https://perma.cc/3Q88-3SWZ]. Texas considered a similar
bill, which would have—had it not halted in committee—opened up the ability for prosecutors
to charge a woman who had an abortion with criminal homicide. H.B. 896, 86th Leg. (Tex.
2019). Under Texas law, criminal homicide can be punishable by the death sentence. TEX.
PENALCODEANN. §§ 12.31, 19.02 (West 2019).
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Against this backdrop comes Melissa Murray, Katherine Shaw, and Reva
Siegel’s13 edited collection of essays, Reproductive Rights and Justice Stories.
The collection could not be timelier. Their volume contains a series of essays
that “bring[] together important cases involving the state regulation of sex,
childbearing, and parenting” (p. 1). The two goals of the collection are to ex-
pand the contours of the field of reproductive rights and justice and to de-
center the role of courts in that field (p. 1).
The editors’ pathbreaking volume cements a definition of reproductive
rights and justice that is both more coherent and more nuanced than many
earlier definitions, which often limited discussions of reproductive rights
and justice to contraception and abortion.14 The volume makes significant
headway in illustrating the many different ways that law affects reproductive
rights and justice.
Broadening readers’ understandings about what constitutes reproduc-
tive rights and justice has several benefits. It illuminates the many different
ways that law and society construct and constrain what parenthood—and
particularly motherhood—entails. Unpacking how law and society have
made motherhood carry certain roles and expectations clarifies the stakes of
traditional reproductive rights and justice issues. For example, if becoming a
parent, and in particular becoming a mother, entails assuming a particular
identity, then the autonomy and liberty interests at stake in parentage deci-
sions are much greater than just bodily autonomy.
The collection of essays also offers a lens through which to understand
myriad legal issues. The volume makes clear that many different topics—
ranging from workplace protections, to labor law, to disability law, to crimi-
nal procedure, to insurance law—implicate reproductive rights and justice in
addition to decisions about whether to criminalize abortion or contracep-
tion. That has the salutary benefit of unearthing the complex web of laws
and social conventions that influence parentage decisions. Understanding all
of the influences on parentage decisions would also make it easier to con-
struct a system that is supportive of families.
By broadening the definition of reproductive rights and justice to in-
clude the many different ways that law and society shape individuals’ deci-
sions about whether to have children, the volume also pushes its readers to
think about additional ways in which law and society influence decisions
about sex and parentage. For example, certain conceptions about the role of
women in society may influence decisions about whether to have children.
So may background societal conditions that make it easier for men to suc-
ceed professionally. These forces may also affect how decisions about repro-
13. Melissa Murray is the Frederick I. and Grace Stokes Professor of Law, New York
University School of Law; Katherine Shaw is a Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School
of Law; and Reva Siegel is the Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
14. In particular, as the introduction notes, it builds on “[t]he publication of the first
casebook on the topic, MELISSAMURRAY & KRISTEN LUKER, CASES ON REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
AND JUSTICE (2015).” P. 1 n.2.
April 2020] Redefining Reproductive Rights and Justice 1099
ductive rights and justice are made. The volume’s nuanced and enriching es-
says invite readers to think about these and other ways in which the field of
reproductive rights and justice might be expanded further still.
The volume also succeeds in its second goal of decentering courts. The
volume states that it seeks to tell reproductive rights and justice “stories us-
ing a wide-lens perspective that illuminates the complex ways law is forged
and debated in social movements, in representative government, and in
courts” (p. 1). The introduction explains that narrating the cases by going
outside of the courts has the virtue of “de-center[ing] courts” within the field
of reproductive rights and justice.15 The volume succeeds in that endeavor
by drawing attention to the social movements and organizing that drive
democratic governance and influence judicial decisionmaking, and by high-
lighting the real women whose lives are affected by laws and judicial deci-
sions on reproductive rights and justice.
But the framework of “decentering courts” calls to mind something that
has become a problem for progressives when it comes to the courts. It is no
secret that there is a historical mismatch between progressives and conserva-
tives when it comes to the judiciary. The mismatch is reflected in myriad
ways, including the comparative focus that Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations give to judicial nominations.16 Conservatives’ relative interest
15. See p. 1.
16. As of November 1 of each president’s third year, Trump had appointed forty-three
judges to the US Courts of Appeals, while Obama had appointed twenty-two. See Judicial Ap-
pointment Tracker, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/judicialtracker [https://perma
.cc/6XPM-SRXL] (comparing the number of judicial vacancies and appointments as of each of
the last six presidents’ third year and showing that conservative presidents, on average, ap-
pointed more judges to the bench than liberal ones); see also Deanna Paul, ‘Keep Those Judges
Coming’: Conservatives Praise Trump’s Success in Filling the Courts, WASH. POST (Nov. 16,
2018, 3:21 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/11/16/keep-those-judges-
coming-conservatives-praise-trumps-success-filling-courts/ (on file with the Michigan Law
Review); Li Zhou, Trump Has Gotten 66 Judges Confirmed This Year. In His Second Year,
Obama Had Gotten 49., VOX (Dec. 27, 2018, 7:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018
/12/27/18136294/trump-mitch-mconnell-republican-judges [https://perma.cc/Y9RJ-56J9].
President Obama’s first chief of staff, Rahm Emanuel, deprioritized spending political capital
on judges while passing key stimulus legislation in Obama’s first term. He “compared himself
to an air traffic controller trying to land multiple jetliners, and said he didn’t want a flock of
geese flying into the middle of them.” Michael Grunwald, Did Obama Win the Judicial Wars?,
POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2016, 5:25 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/obama-courts-
judicial-legacy-226741 [https://perma.cc/CG2J-E4LY].
Of course, some of this focus is a product of the administrations and courts that preceded
them—part of the Republican focus on courts reflects lessons learned from the Warren Court,
and part of the Democratic disinterest and lack of faith in courts reflects lessons learned from
the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts. See Jack M. Balkin,Why Liberals and Conservatives
Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L.
REV. 215, 233–35 (2019); see, e.g., Maurice Chammah, Two Parties, Two Platforms on Criminal
Justice, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 18, 2016, 9:51 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016
/07/18/two-parties-two-platforms-on-criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/Z7BA-8KTW] (sug-
gesting that the Republican Party focuses more on using federal courts to reduce crime, while
the Democratic party platform focuses more on community-based practices and other organiz-
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in the courts is part of what produced the Trump presidency and its war on
reproductive justice in the first place; Republican voters identified the courts,
and the Supreme Court in particular, as an important voting issue for
them.17
There is a risk that decentering courts and urging a focus on other ac-
tors’ roles in reproductive rights and justice will obscure something that is so
basic it may not seem academically interesting—courts are important, in-
cluding to reproductive justice and to women’s lives. The essays in the vol-
ume have passages that imply that courts are important,18 and the editors of
the volume have elsewhere defended the importance of courts and judicial
doctrine.19 But the mismatch between the right and the left on the courts
now threatens the very field that is the subject of the edited collection. With
Roe and so many other protections for reproductive justice now on the line,
part of what this Review will do is bring out a point that the volume makes
quietly or through inference or implication: the courts are worth caring
about, especially when it comes to reproductive rights and reproductive jus-
tice.
I. DEFININGREPRODUCTIVERIGHTS AND JUSTICE
The volume makes an important contribution by providing a coherent
and nuanced definition of what reproductive rights and justice entails.20 The
volume reflects the editors’ position that the “contours” of the field, properly
understood, “are quite broad” and encompass “a wider range of issues” than
just “decisionmaking about contraception and abortion” (p. 1), which is how
the field of reproductive rights and justice has often been defined.21 The vol-
ing tools to address issues in criminal justice). For a piece critical of progressives’ attitude to-
ward courts, see Scott L. Cummings, Rethinking the Foundational Critiques of Lawyers in Social
Movements, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987 (2017).
17. See, e.g., Jennifer Bendery, Don’t Forget About Trump’s Judicial Nominees. Another
44 Just Moved Forward., HUFFPOST (Feb. 7, 2019, 8:14 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry
/trump-judicial-nominees-lgbtq-abortion-voting-rights_n_5c5c97d6e4b0e01e32aa8edf
[https://perma.cc/FF9X-WFUL] (discussing how recent judicial appointees have ruled on
abortion rights, among other issues).
18. See Franklin, p. 227; Murray, p. 28 (“[T]he decision’s articulation of a right to priva-
cy set in motion a ‘privacy revolution.’ ”); Siegel, p. 35 & n.13.
19. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Backlash to the Future? From Roe to
Perry, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 240, 245–46 (2013); Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel,
The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Wom-
an’s Health, 126 YALE L.J.F. 149, 149–50 (2016); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Demo-
cratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 373–74 (2007); Reva B.
Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1728, 1744
(2017). Reva Siegel and Linda Greenhouse’s essay in the volume continues these themes. See
Greenhouse & Siegel, p. 53.
20. See p. 1.
21. Again an important exception is MELISSA MURRAY & KRISTIN LUKER, CASES ON
REPRODUCTIVERIGHTS AND JUSTICE (2015).
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ume makes important headway on this front by weaving together “cases
[that] have not often been conceived of as part of a unified field of law.” 22
Broadening our understanding about what reproductive rights and jus-
tice entails is helpful for several reasons. It illuminates the stakes of tradi-
tional reproductive rights and justice issues—by pointing out what law and
society expect parents, and in particular mothers, to be.23 It unearths the
laws and social structures that influence sex and parentage decisions, which
is helpful to reforming and constructing a regime that is truly supportive of
families and of parentage decisions.24 And it offers a novel lens through
which to understand many different issues that are not often thought of in
terms of reproductive rights and justice.
Part of what is exciting about the collection’s move is that it invites read-
ers to think about other aspects of law and society that might fit under the
volume’s broadened definition of reproductive rights and justice. For exam-
ple, it might be helpful to consider how the institutions of civil society, dem-
ocratic politics, and courts understand sex, women, and gender equity in a
broader sense than the essays cover. The ways in which women are treated at
work, apart from whether they have children, may also shape women’s deci-
sions about whether to have children. So may societal expectations about
women and their bodies. One of the key insights of one of the volume’s es-
says is that society can police sex roles and family relationships even if the
government does not do so via criminal law,25 a provocative suggestion that
implies reproductive rights and justice encompasses the many different ways
that society values or devalues women’s autonomy. Section I.A discusses the
broadened definition of reproductive rights and justice that the volume of-
fers, and Section I.B considers some other pockets of law that might fit with-
in that broader definition, as well as one possible concern with the
broadened definition.
A. An Expanded Definition
The introduction to the volume informs its readers that one of the vol-
ume’s goals is to “examine[] the many ways law shapes the choice to have, as
well as to avoid having, children” (p. 1). The volume does this in part by hav-
22. See p. 1 (emphasis omitted).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 92–95 (discussing Rubenfeld and Murray essays).
24. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, ProChoiceLife: Asking Who Protects Life and How—And Why It
Matters in Law and Politics, 93 IND. L.J. 207, 207–09 (2018) (outlining what legal scrutiny of
states’ interest in protecting life and a legal regime interested in protecting life might look like).
25. Murray, p. 29 (“[M]ore than fifty years after Griswold began the process of decrimi-
nalizing contraception, access to contraception remains a subject of intense debate and contes-
tation in the United States.”); Murray, p. 31 (“[T]he stigma and disapproval that once attended
contraceptive use can still be felt—albeit in more muted forms . . . . These insights make clear
the limitations of decriminalization as a means of law reform, and underscore the many vehi-
cles, beyond the criminal law, that the state may deploy in its efforts to enforce a particular vi-
sion of sex and sexuality.”).
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ing its audience read a varied set of cases that are not typically grouped to-
gether. This lumping of cases “makes visible forms and effects of reproduc-
tive regulation that are less evident when the cases are read in isolation”
(p. 1).
The essays in the volume do yeoman’s work in widening the reader’s
lens to myriad ways in which law affects matters of sex and childbearing. I
will highlight just two. First is the volume’s focus on laws and policies that
concern the workplace. One of the essays in this category is Neil Siegel’s
piece on Struck v. Secretary of Defense,26 a case involving an Air Force Cap-
tain who was fired when she became pregnant (Siegel, p. 33). In the essay,
Siegel highlights a brief by then-ACLU-attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg
(Siegel, pp. 37, 39–42). The brief argued that the Air Force’s decision to fire
Captain Struck violated equal protection because it “enforced the sex roles
and stereotypes of the separate-spheres tradition” and evaluated pregnant
women as a group that was inherently unfit for the workforce (Siegel, p. 39).
It does not take much to see how policies like the Air Force’s shape decisions
about whether to “bear or beget” a child,27 yet cases like Struck are not taught
together with cases on contraception or abortion, at least in traditional con-
stitutional law classes, even though it would enrich our understanding of
them.
The collection includes other essays about how laws treat women who
choose to have children, and these essays also focus on economic issues.
Deborah Dinner’s essay analyzes Geduldig v. Aiello,28 the case in which the
Court held that California’s disability benefits scheme, which excluded cov-
erage for disabilities related to pregnancy, did not constitute discrimination
on the basis of sex (Dinner, pp. 77, 79). Kate Shaw’s essay focuses on Young
v. UPS,29 the recent Supreme Court case that interpreted the scope of the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which prohibits employers from taking ad-
verse employment actions against employees on the basis of pregnancy
(Shaw, pp. 205–06).
Although Dinner and Shaw’s essays both focus on different forms of le-
gal support for women who choose to have children, they arrive at very dif-
ferent assessments about society’s willingness to absorb some of the costs
related to pregnancy and childbirth. Dinner’s essay maintains that Geduldig
reflected a societal unwillingness to redistribute the costs associated with
pregnancy, which forced individual women to bear them all (Dinner, pp. 79,
90–95). Shaw views the more recently decided Young, which ruled in favor of
the pregnant employee, as a reason for optimism about the possibility that
an ideologically varied coalition will shoulder some of the costs associated
26. 409 U.S. 1071 (1972).
27. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
28. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
29. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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with pregnancy by being attentive to the needs of pregnant women in the
workplace.30
The collection also includes essays that touch on other aspects of family
care and the workplace. Sam Bagenstos’s essay examines Nevada Department
of Human Resources v. Hibbs,31 the decision upholding the family-care pro-
visions of the Family and Medical Leave Act (Bagenstos, p. 183). The family-
care provisions require employers to offer employees a certain amount of
leave time in order to care for their families.32 Hibbs recognized that sex ste-
reotyping and traditional sex roles often affect which employees take time off
from work to care for family and, perhaps more importantly, that they affect
employers’ expectations about which employees will take time off from work
to care for family.33 Mandating family care leave for everyone, Hibbs sug-
gested, would address the resulting sex-based disparities.34
The second way in which the edited collection improves our under-
standing of the field of reproductive rights and justice is by bringing to light
the stark racial and socioeconomic disparities that permeate matters related
to decisions about whether to have a child. Maya Manian’s essay on Madri-
gal v. Quilligan35 reconstructs the story of the “Madrigal Ten,” a group of
Mexican-American women who claimed the Los Angeles County Police De-
partment coerced them into submitting to sterilization (Manian, p. 97). The
deeply racialized history and practice of sterilization is crucial to better un-
derstanding traditional reproductive rights and justice cases such as Buck v.
Bell.36 It is also important to assessing modern sterilization practices. Take
the recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decision in Sullivan v.
Benningfield, which addressed Tennessee’s policy of affording inmates a thir-
ty-day sentencing credit if the inmates submitted to sterilization.37 The dis-
sent referred to the policy as a means of offering “free contraceptive
30. Shaw, p. 207. I do not share Shaw’s optimism, particularly in light of recent discus-
sions about health insurance coverage for contraception or mammograms; occasionally, some
participants in the discussions will assert that it is unfair for men to pay for these treatments as
part of insurance schemes. See Amber Phillips, ‘I Wouldn’t Want to Lose My Mammograms,’
Male GOP Senator Says – then Immediately Regrets, WASH. POST: FIX (Mar. 23, 2017, 4:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/03/23/i-wouldnt-want-to-lose-my-
mammograms-snipes-gop-male-lawmaker/ (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (quoting
Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin as saying “I don’t need maternity benefits because I don’t ex-
pect I’ll be expecting”); see also Siegel, supra note 24, at 222 (“Attitudes about private property,
rather than gender and sexuality, may explain a state’s choice of means to protect life. Differ-
ently put, conservatives may oppose the expansion of Medicaid because they are hostile to re-
distribution and are committed to a limited state.”).
31. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
32. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724.
33. Id. at 735–37.
34. Id. at 737. Mandating family leave for everyone would not address the cultural
norms suggesting that mothers should do the heavy lifting on parenting.
35. 639 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1981) (unpublished table decision).
36. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
37. 920 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2019).
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services.”38 Manian’s essay and others in the collection suggest that the dis-
sent’s understanding of the policy elides important realities about who the
policy may be used against and why. As Manian explains, policies that are
ostensibly facially neutral may be applied in ways that reflect societal biases
and prejudices and that ultimately operate to the detriment of marginalized
communities.39
Like Manian’s essay, Khiara Bridges’s essay on Harris v. McRae40 high-
lights how the law at issue in Harris, the Hyde Amendment, had outsized ef-
fects on marginalized communities and racial minorities, even though the
case made little mention of those disparities.41 The Hyde Amendment pro-
hibits federal funds from being used for abortion, including in the Medicaid
program (Bridges, p. 117). Priscilla Ocen’s essay on Ferguson v. City of
Charleston42 similarly identifies how the decision in that case (which invali-
dated a hospital policy on drug testing) did not grapple with how the hospi-
tal often used its policy to drug test pregnant women—and specifically poor,
black women—during the height of the panic about crack cocaine (Ocen,
pp. 161–63). That failure, Ocen notes, has left some uncertainty about
whether and when states may criminalize women’s actions during their
pregnancies (Ocen, p. 163).
The residual uncertainty is troubling because of the racial and socioeco-
nomic disparities often produced by criminalization, including the criminal-
ization of pregnancy. Consider the recent case of an Alabama woman who
was initially prosecuted for manslaughter after she got into a fight with a
coworker, during which the coworker shot her in the belly, killing the fetus
she carried.43 The state prosecutor indicted the woman for “initiating a fight
knowing she was five months pregnant.”44 Only after the case “stirred na-
tional outrage” did prosecutors drop the charges.45 Michele Goodwin has de-
scribed other examples of this phenomenon, including a sixteen-year-old
38. Id. at 413 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting).
39. SeeManian, p. 99.
40. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
41. Bridges, pp. 117–18, 127. Bridges’s essay builds on her book, The Poverty of Privacy
Rights, which highlights how poor communities and communities of color have substantially
less privacy rights given the many ways in which the law assigns the women fault for their pov-
erty. See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017). For a review of
Bridges’s book, see Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State,
127 YALE L.J. 1270 (2018).
42. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
43. See Farah Stockman, Alabamians Defend Arrest of Woman Whose Fetus Died in
Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/30/us/alabama-
woman-marshae-jones.html [https://perma.cc/C5TB-HRYB].
44. Farah Stockman, Manslaughter Charge Dropped Against Alabama Woman Who
Was Shot While Pregnant, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/03/us
/charges-dropped-alabama-woman-pregnant.html [https://perma.cc/XMA8-NKGX] (quoting
Indictment, Alabama v. Jones, No. CC19-719 (Ala. Cir. Ct. May 1, 2019)).
45. Id.
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woman who was charged with depraved-heart murder after her child was
stillborn, and a woman who was charged with first-degree murder after she
tried and failed to end her own life by eating poison while pregnant.46 In
these cases, prosecutors are pursuing charges and advancing theories that
apply only to pregnant women—their actions carry particular criminal con-
sequences only because they are pregnant.
Again it is not difficult to see—but still important to underscore—how
these essays enrich the field of reproductive rights and justice. They both
broaden the definition of the field and give more depth to the traditional
contours of the field, contraception and abortion. The essays make clear, for
example, why it would be a grave oversight to have a discussion about the
legal regulation of abortion without acknowledging that maternal mortality
rates for black women are significantly higher than those for white women.47
Without appreciating that disparity, how can we assess, as the doctrine re-
quires, whether restrictions on abortion benefit the health and safety of
women or unduly burden women by jeopardizing their well-being?48
The various essays also add value to one another in ways that underscore
the power of the volume’s definition of the field of reproductive rights and
justice. The essays that draw out racial disparities in reproductive rights and
justice (including the essays on Ferguson, Harris, and Madrigal) enrich the
essays on the workplace (including the essays on Geduldig, Stark, Young, and
Hibbs). Consider the juxtaposition of the essays on Geduldig and Harris. In
Harris, the government was (and still is) unwilling to help women who
would choose not to have a child, and who would forgo the health risks that
go along with doing so.49 In Geduldig, the government was unwilling to help
women who chose to have a child, and who experienced health issues as a
result.50 What does it say about our health care system that it is unwilling to
assist women no matter what decision they make about whether to have a
child?
B. AMore Expansive Definition
In addition to making wonderful headway in enriching understandings
about what reproductive rights and justice entails, the volume also invites its
readers to think about what else might fit within the volume’s expanded def-
46. Michele Goodwin, Opinion, Alabama Isn’t the Only State that Punishes Pregnant
Women, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/opinion/alabama-
pregnant-woman-shot.html [https://perma.cc/QQ4L-WJRB] (citing cases involving Rennie
Gibbs and Bei Bei Shuai and connecting these cases to Ferguson v. City of Charleston).
47. Roni Caryn Rabin, Huge Racial Disparities Found in Deaths Linked to Pregnancy,
N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/07/health/pregnancy-deaths-
.html [https://perma.cc/5WDN-PN73].
48. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016); Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
49. SeeHarris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
50. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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inition of reproductive rights and justice. This Part offers some thoughts on
other topics that might also fall under this broader conception of reproduc-
tive rights and justice. Consider the volume’s insight that the field of repro-
ductive rights and justice should consider certain aspects of the workplace,
such as the availability of work for pregnant women and women with chil-
dren. If the availability of work for pregnant women and women with chil-
dren shapes decisions about whether to have a child, then so too might the
availability of quality health care, health insurance, and safe environments
for pregnant women and women with children. The volume also asks its
readers to think about how the law takes away from poor women (particular-
ly poor women of color) the decision to have children, which calls to mind
the significant racial and socioeconomic disparities in access to health care
and safe environments that might limit some women’s ability to have chil-
dren. Finally, some of the essays in the volume suggest that the general
treatment of women in the workplace, including through the law on sexual
harassment, might also be relevant to reproductive rights and justice and to
how reproductive rights are made.
1. Sociolegal Factors Affecting Parenting Decisions
The volume’s essays on the workplace’s treatment of pregnancy or fami-
ly care suggest that decisions about whether to offer support to pregnant
women or women with children relate to reproductive justice. The essays of-
fer a clear narrative about how these laws “shape[] the choice to have, as well
as to avoid having, children” (p. 1). If employers can fire or refuse to ac-
commodate workers who are pregnant, or states can choose not to assist
women who become ill while pregnant, that will affect decisions about
whether to bear or beget a child.51
But other facets of law and society that are not covered by the volume
will also affect parentage decisions, and through similar mechanisms as legal
protections for pregnant women or women with families. The availability of
health insurance and health care, for example, may affect choices about
whether to have a child, just like access to employment during and after
pregnancy may.52 Employment and health insurance are important benefits
that allow individuals to care for themselves and their families, and the avail-
ability of those benefits is occasionally affected by a woman’s decision to
have a child. Before the Affordable Care Act, insurance companies could re-
fuse to sell policies to individuals with preexisting conditions, and they could
51. A whopping 38 percent of women reported that they decided to end a pregnancy
because they feared it would interfere with their job or career. Lawrence B. Finer et al., Reasons
U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON SEXUAL
&REPROD. HEALTH 110, 113 (2005).
52. These issues are connected in the United States, though not always. The extent of
insurance coverage is a separate issue, which Melissa Murray writes about in the conclusion of
her essay. Murray, pp. 29–31.
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charge individuals with preexisting conditions more for health insurance.53
And insurance companies sometimes deemed conditions associated with
pregnancy preexisting conditions that precluded insurance coverage54 or
sold insurance policies that excluded coverage for maternity care.55 If insur-
ance companies can charge women who become pregnant more for insur-
ance, or if they can exclude maternity care from insurance coverage, that too
may affect decisions about whether to bear and beget a child. One of the es-
says in the collection, Melissa Murray’s essay on Griswold v. Connecticut,
gestures in this direction.56 Murray notes that limiting states’ ability to crim-
inalize certain conduct such as using contraception may not be sufficient to
achieve reproductive justice so long as laws permit employers or other pri-
vate actors to penalize individuals for that same conduct.57
There are also racial disparities in the American health care system in
both the level of care and the overall health outcomes that individuals expe-
rience.58 Do these disparities affect decisions about whether to have a family?
Given their effect on infant mortality rates, the disparities in health care and
health care outcomes may affect women’s ability to have a family at all.59
53. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012); see also
Pre-Existing Conditions, HHS.GOV (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/about-the-
aca/pre-existing-conditions/index.html [https://perma.cc/D6YB-ZJ42] (explaining how the
Affordable Care Act prevents insurance providers from denying coverage on the basis of a pre-
existing condition).
54. Insurance When You’re Pregnant: FAQ, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.com/health-
insurance/aca-pregnancy-faq [https://perma.cc/PXY9-KWP2]; What Are Pre-Existing Condi-
tions?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/health-care-
equity/what-are-pre-existing-conditions [https://perma.cc/EQ2F-P7YL].
55. E.g., Theresa Chalhoub, How the Latest ACA Repeal Plan Would Harm Women,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 29, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues
/healthcare/news/2018/06/29/453011/latest-aca-repeal-plan-harm-women/ [https://perma.cc
/NJ6M-V35V]; Louise Norris, How Obamacare Changed Maternity Coverage,
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.healthinsurance.org/obamacare/how-
obamacare-changed-maternity-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/HC5R-8V6K].
56. See Murray, pp. 29–31 (“[M]ore than fifty years after Griswold began the process of
decriminalizing contraception, access to contraception remains a subject of intense debate and
contestation in the United States.”).
57. Murray, p. 31 (“[T]he stigma and disapproval that once attended contraceptive use
can still be felt—albeit in more muted forms . . . . These insights make clear the limitations of
decriminalization as a means of law reform, and underscore the many vehicles, beyond the
criminal law, that the state may deploy in its efforts to enforce a particular vision of sex and
sexuality.”). For more on this theme from Murray, see Melissa Murray, Consequential Sex:
#MeToo,Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Private Sexual Regulation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 825 (2019).
58. See Khiara M. Bridges, Implicit Bias and Racial Disparities in Health Care, 43 HUM.
RTS., no. 3, 2018, at 19.
59. See Douglas Almond et al., Civil Rights, the War on Poverty, and Black-White Con-
vergence in Infant Mortality in the Rural South and Mississippi (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Dep’t of
Econ., Working Paper No. 07–04, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=961021 [https://perma.cc/NLH5-KKRU] (suggesting that mandated desegregation as a result
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 of institutions receiving federal funds accounted for
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The different economic opportunities available to men and women may
also implicate reproductive justice. It is well established that women make,
on average, less money than men for similar work.60 It is also no secret that
men possess an outsized portion of wealth in the United States and seem to
have an easier time ascending to economically powerful positions. Men at-
tract more venture capital for startups;61 the CEOs of Fortune 500 companies
are primarily men;62 and the managing partners and law firm leadership are
also primarily men.63 Women in more socioeconomically vulnerable groups
are also treated worse than their male counterparts.64 The federal minimum
wage statute does not extend to certain categories of domestic workers,65 a
profession that was understood, when Congress enacted the statute, to be
primarily filled with women, particularly women of color.66
These realities about the workplace may implicate reproductive rights
and justice just as other professional and economic disadvantages that dis-
up to up to 35 percent of national decline in the infant mortality rate of black children nation-
wide between 1965 and 1975).
60. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and
Explanations, 55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 789, 852–55 (2017) (analyzing microdata to explore rea-
sons for differences in the gender wage gap and suggesting that because some gap remains even
after accounting for differences in occupational distributions and an increase in college at-
tainment of women, labor-market discrimination may continue to contribute to the gender
wage gap); see also Alan S. Blinder, Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Esti-
mates, 8 J. HUM. RESOURCES 436 (1973) (exemplifying early findings and research into gender-
based wage discrimination); Ronald Oaxaca, Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor
Markets, 14 INT’L ECON. REV. 693 (1973).
61. Valentina Zarya, Female Founders Got 2% of Venture Capital Dollars in 2017,
FORTUNE (Jan. 31, 2018, 7:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2018/01/31/female-founders-venture-
capital-2017/ [https://perma.cc/3RNT-ZUDY].
62. Claire Zillman, The Fortune 500 Has More Female CEOs than Ever Before, FORTUNE
(May 16, 2019, 6:30 AM), http://fortune.com/2019/05/16/fortune-500-female-ceos/
[https://perma.cc/4NV2-78QE] (stating that while the number of Fortune 500 companies led
by female CEOs is at an all-time high, only 6.6 percent of all Fortune 500 companies are led by
a female CEO).
63. Cristina Violante & Jacqueline Bell, Law360’s Glass Ceiling Report, by the Numbers,
LAW360 (May 28, 2018, 9:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/1047285
[https://perma.cc/WGT8-XNJ4] (discussing results from Law360 survey that found that men
make up 79% of the equity partner tier at the almost 350 law firms surveyed, while white wom-
en make up 17.9% and minority women make up less than 3%).
64. For example, single mothers were twenty percentage points more likely to be in pov-
erty than single fathers with children between 1969 and 2006. Maria Cancian & Deborah Reed,
Family Structure, Childbearing, and Parental Employment: Implications for the Level and Trend
in Poverty, FOCUS, Fall 2009, at 21, 24 tbl.1.
65. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 13, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)).
66. See Madeleine Joung, Domestic Workers Aren’t Protected by Anti-Discrimination
Law. This New Bill Would Change That, TIME (July 15, 2019, 12:04 PM),
https://time.com/5626156/domestic-workers-anti-discrimination-law-ndwa/ [https://perma.cc
/5L76-GEVM] (noting that in 2012 nearly 90 percent of live-in workers were women, more
than half of whom were women of color).
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proportionately fall on women implicate reproductive rights and justice. Sta-
tistics indicate that a significant number of women choose not to have a
child because they are concerned about their ability to provide financially for
a child.67 In light of this data, why isn’t wage theft or the ability to obtain a
living wage a matter of reproductive rights and justice?
If the field of reproductive rights and justice is properly understood to
cover all of the ways in which law and society shape the decision about
whether to have a child, the field would not be limited to the availability of
health care or health insurance or living wages. Access to nutrition and clean
water might affect decisions about whether to have children too. There are
some places in the United States that have gone for years without clean wa-
ter, spanning an entire generation of children.68 A complex web of laws and
policies limits would-be parents’ and others’ ability to leave these environ-
mentally unsafe areas.69 Isn’t it a matter of reproductive justice that some
would-be parents and their potential children struggle to obtain adequate
nutrition and clean water?
Access to clean water and healthcare affect reproductive rights in ways
that the essays suggest are relevant to thinking about the field of reproduc-
tive justice. Poor nutrition, unclean water, environmental pollution, and lim-
ited healthcare may affect women’s ability to have children at all.70 Manian’s
essay on coerced sterilization and Ocen’s essay on the criminalization of
pregnancy highlight different ways in which law and society take away the
ability to have children from poor women, particularly poor women of color.
67. Finer et al., supra note 51, at 113–18 (describing a study that employed different
questions and data from 2004 and found that 73 percent of women reported having an abor-
tion because they could not afford having a baby); see also Claire Cain Miller, Americans Are
Having Fewer Babies. They Told Us Why., N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (July 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/upshot/americans-are-having-fewer-babies-they-told-
us-why.html [http://perma.cc/75YX-X7MQ] (discussing results from a self-commissioned sur-
vey that found that among the most common reasons stated by the almost 2,000 men and
women surveyed for not having children were concerns over the state of the economy, indi-
vidual student debt, and affordability of child care or a home).
68. FOOD & WATER WATCH, THE WATER CRISIS IN MARTIN COUNTY, KENTUCKY
(2008), https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/sites/default/files/ib_1802_martincntykywater-
web5.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4GH-XXVH]; Maura Allaire et al., National Trends in Drinking
Water Quality Violations, 115 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2078, 2081–82 (2018) (discussing and
demonstrating, in Figures 3 and 4, an increase in health-based violations of drinking water
quality in rural areas of the United States over a thirty-four-year period).
69. Sara S. Greene, A Theory of Poverty: Legal Immobility, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 753,
786–88 (2019) (explaining, using a hypothetical situation, how state and local laws hinder up-
ward mobility); see also David Schleicher, Stuck! The Law and Economics and Residential Stag-
nation, 127 YALE. L.J. 78, 123 (2017) (suggesting that the localized nature of legal regimes,
public services, and public benefit programs inhibit the ability of people to exit a region, even
in times of a negative economic shock).
70. See, e.g., Neelima Panth et al., The Influence of Diet on Fertility and the Implications
for Public Health Nutrition in the United States, FRONTIERS PUB. HEALTH (July 31, 2018),
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2018.00211 [https://perma.cc/XC3H-257M] (documenting the
relationship between poor nutrition and lower fertility).
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If that is relevant to the study of reproductive rights and justice (and I agree
with the essayists and editors that it is), then so too is the kind of health care
and health insurance that we provide to women, and so too is the clean water
and nutrition that we should ensure they have access to.
To be sure, defining the field this expansively raises boundary questions
of its own, such as identifying what wouldn’t be covered within the field of
reproductive rights and justice. If every law or social norm that has an effect
on decisions about whether to have children fits within the field, that could
encompass almost everything under the sun.71 But opening readers’ eyes to
the myriad ways law and society shape these decisions is an important move,
and the limits on the field can be constructed later.
2. Women at Work
One of the great insights of the edited collection is the essays’ recogni-
tion that the treatment of women at work is relevant to understanding re-
productive rights and justice. The edited collection provides various reasons
why the treatment of women in the workplace relates to reproductive rights
and justice. The treatment of women at work affects families’ ability to pro-
vide for their children, which may affect families’ decisions about whether to
have children (Siegel, p. 49). How women are treated at work also has some
connection to the kind of sex stereotyping that the essays argue relates to re-
productive rights and justice. Neil Siegel’s essay on Ginsburg’s brief in
Struck, for example, argues that the brief’s key insight to reproductive rights
and justice is “that laws enforcing traditional sex stereotypes inflict harm be-
cause they reinforce ‘the subordinate position of women in our society and
the second-class status our institutions historically have imposed upon
them.’ ”72 As Siegel explains, sex stereotyping and the subordination of wom-
en—including through their exclusion from the workplace—are relevant to
reproductive rights and justice.
If the essayists and editors are right that these reasons explain why the
treatment of women at work is relevant to reproductive rights and justice
(and again, I think that they are), then perhaps the law of sexual harassment
is also relevant to thinking about reproductive rights and justice. The law of
sexual harassment may also shape decisions about whether to have a child
for the same reasons that other ways in which women are treated at work
shape decisions about whether to have a child. Sexual harassment might af-
fect a parent’s ability to provide for their family: the harassment may be so
bad it forces someone out of a job or a profession, and harassment may also
tax and strain victims in other ways that affect their personal or family lives.
71. This way of defining the field—laws that have an effect on parentage and family de-
cisions—is reminiscent of Jill Hasday’s work documenting how much of family law is federal
because federal laws, like state law, will shape decisions about whether to have children. See,
e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297 (1998).
72. Siegel, p. 45 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 27, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071
(1972) (No. 72-178)).
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And, equally important, sexual harassment also reflects and reinforces the
same mechanism of sex discrimination that Ginsburg’s brief in Struck identi-
fied—the subordination of women in society and their second-class status in
institutions of labor.
There is much to say about the law of sexual harassment along these
lines. Consider, for example, how courts have adopted extremely narrow in-
terpretations about what amounts to actionable sexual harassment. To con-
stitute harassment, the behavior must be “severe or pervasive,” and courts
have held that persistent groping, sexual propositions, and sexualized com-
ments do not constitute severe and pervasive conduct.73 Jessica Clarke has
outlined the myriad ways courts have developed tools to minimize or dis-
count evidence of sex discrimination or sexual harassment.74 Clarke discuss-
es the “stray remarks” doctrine, under which courts can write off sexualized
or harassing comments, as well as comments that reveal straight up bias.75
As Clarke notes, “one court dismissed a case brought by a female investment
banker whose supervisor routinely called her ‘such epithets as “bitch,”
“cunt,” “whore,” “slut” and “tart,” ’ reasoning that these remarks were irrele-
vant to . . . whether she was paid less money in bonuses than her male sub-
ordinates because of sex discrimination.”76
Another similar case is Brooks v. City of San Mateo.77 Both the court of
appeals and the district court held that a 911 phone dispatcher did not allege
severe and pervasive harassment when she claimed that her coworker
touched her stomach and commented on how soft and sexy it was and then
forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra to fondle her breast when
she tried to push him away.78 Other women reported that the same coworker
had treated them in similar ways.79 Or consider the case of Melody Swenson,
who worked as a mail sorter for the Postal Service.80 For several months,
Swenson’s coworker battered her with unwanted attention.81 He told her she
had a “beautiful sexy body,” that he was “watching [her] ass moving,” and
that he dreamed about her.82 He mouthed the word “sexy” at her, gave her a
gift, asked to kiss her, and grabbed her.83 After Swenson complained, the
73. SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS
UNDERMINEDISCRIMINATION LAW 34–40 (2017) (outlining and critiquing this phenomenon).
74. Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113NW. U. L. REV. 505 (2018).
75. Id. at 540.
76. Id. at 510 (quoting Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, No. 02 CIV.5191(VM), 2003 WL
22251313, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2003)).
77. 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).
78. Id. at 921–22, 930.
79. Id. at 922.
80. Swenson v. Potter, 271 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2001).
81. Id. at 1189.
82. Id. at 1200.
83. Id.
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Postal Service moved Swenson, against her wishes, to another work area.84
Swenson later sued, arguing that the Postal Service mishandled her harass-
ment complaint.85 The court of appeals said it did not.86
When we think about reproductive justice, perhaps it is worth thinking
about some of the ways in which the law allows women to be sexualized and
subordinated at work and whether and how that might shape decisions
about whether to have a child. The stories behind these cases would tell us
something about the kinds of conditions that women endure in order to ob-
tain the kind of reproductive justice that goes along with a well-paying (or
sufficiently paying) job or an employer-provided health insurance plan. The
cases may also reinforce or supplement Dinner’s narrative about Geduldig,
which framed the case in terms of society’s decision about who bears the
costs that are associated with sex and families.87 The sexual harassment cases
are about society’s unwillingness to force harassers or their employers to
bear the costs of harassment, which makes the harasser’s victims, often
women, bear them all. These narratives may be related, and they may be re-
lated in ways that can better our understanding of what reproductive rights
and justice could mean.
Sexual harassment may also inform our thinking about more traditional
aspects of reproductive rights and justice. Sex discrimination, including sex-
ual harassment, can result in harms that sound in the register of reproduc-
tive rights and justice. Discrimination on the basis of sex, including sexual
harassment, can send the message that some people are less worthy of “equal
concern and respect,”88 and that message may be internalized and reflected
in other contexts, including the legal regulation of decisions about whether
to have a child.89 The underlying message of discrimination, subordination,
or stereotypes can be normalized and perpetuated.90 Medical research has
also identified a person’s experience with discrimination as being associated
with adverse mental and physical health outcomes.91
Sexual harassment isn’t about sex, of course; it’s about power (or power
over sex, or power over one of the sexes). But the same could be said—and
indeed, has been forcefully said—about other matters of reproductive rights
84. Id. at 1204.
85. Id. at 1191.
86. Id. at 1197.
87. Dinner, p. 79; see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
88. See RONALDDWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977).
89. See Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117
HARV. L. REV. 493, 569–70, 577–84 (2003).
90. Clarke, supra note 74, at 518–23 (summarizing research).
91. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pascoe & Laura Smart Richman, Perceived Discrimination and
Health: A Meta-Analytic Review, 135 PSYCHOL. BULL. 531, 531 (2009); Yin Paradies et al., Rac-
ism as a Determinant of Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, PLOS ONE (Sept. 23,
2015), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0138511 [https://perma.cc/TT2S-K5GT] (discuss-
ing the “growing body of epidemiological evidence . . . documenting the health impacts of rac-
ism” and reviewing 293 studies).
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and justice. Jed Rubenfeld articulated the point as follows: “Women should
be able to abort their pregnancies so that they may avoid being forced into
an identity, not because they are defining their identities through the deci-
sion itself.”92
Using this lens, what Casey and other reproductive rights and justice de-
cisions recognize is that assuming the identity of motherhood unwillingly,
and under compulsion by the state, is antithetical to liberty. The identity of
motherhood in particular is wrought with social and political expectations
and consequences. As Reproductive Rights and Justice Stories highlights,
motherhood carries a particular set of roles and responsibilities that have
been constructed and reinforced over time, in part through the legal regula-
tion of parentage and families, but also through social structures and civic
society. Melissa Murray, one of the editors of the collection, has previously
written about the legal structures that “rebuke[] [women] when they fail to
align their behavior with th[e] model of self-abnegating motherhood.”93 The
“caregiving norms” that are cultivated and imposed by such laws, in turn,
“transcend law and become embedded in daily life, creating a culture of
motherhood in which mothers are rigorously scrutinized and, in turn, rigor-
ously scrutinize themselves.”94 The result is that the “trope of selfless, sacri-
ficing mothers is not only present in law; it echoes throughout our culture.”95
The power struggle in Casey is therefore about more than just the deci-
sion about whether to have a child. It is also about whether to assume the so-
cial and political identity that comes along with motherhood; some people
may want to be mothers, but do not want the identity it carries. In some
ways, the power struggle in all of the cases in Reproductive Rights and Justice
Stories is about what the social and political identity of motherhood or par-
entage will entail—does it involve primarily caretaking, rather than being in
the workforce; does it involve responsibility for all of the physical costs of
childbirth; does it involve state monitoring of women’s bodies; etc. These
concepts are inextricably related: if the identity of motherhood is so all en-
compassing and riddled with expectations and rules, then assuming that
identity unwillingly will raise substantial concerns.
92. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 782 (1989) (emphasis
omitted). It has been reported that Rubenfeld is under Title IX investigation for harassing be-
haviors toward students. See Dahlia Lithwick & Susan Matthews, Investigation at Yale Law
School, SLATE (Oct. 5, 2018, 3:58 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/10/jed-
rubenfeld-amy-chua-yale-law-school.html [https://perma.cc/MV92-VGYG].
93. Melissa Murray, Panopti-Moms, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 165, 173 & n.51 (2013). The
essay focused in particular on how “[c]hild molestation laws cultivate and impose caregiving
norms upon women caregivers . . . instilling in them a sense of near-constant surveillance, lim-
iting their autonomy, and facilitating the internalization of gendered norms regarding caregiv-
ing and extra-domestic activities like paid work.” Id. at 168.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 173.
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3. Women and Power
Incorporating others forms of sex discrimination, such as sexual har-
assment, into the study of reproductive rights and justice would also force
readers to consider the relationship between who makes the law on repro-
ductive rights and justice and the content of the law itself.96 One anecdote
that sheds some light on this topic is the case of former Judge Alex Kozinski,
the influential former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit who retired (with a full pension) after several women accused him of
inappropriate conduct.97 The allegations against Judge Kozinski included the
claim that Kozinski repeatedly showed one of his law clerks pornography
and asked if it turned her on (after referring to her as his slave),98 a former
judge’s allegation that Judge Kozinski propositioned her and groped her
breasts when she turned him down,99 and other accusations of inappropriate
sexual remarks and touching,100 including court-wide emails about female
96. Several decades ago, Catharine MacKinnon urged scholars to think about the ways
in which law is uncritically and systematically male oriented. She identified one source of law’s
male orientation as the feedback loop between who benefits from the law and who writes it. See
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8
SIGNS 635 (1983).
97. I was one of those women. See Leah Litman, Emily Murphy & Katherine H. Ku,
Opinion, A Comeback but No Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/sunday/alex-kozinski-harassment-allegations-
comeback.html [https://perma.cc/5H9Y-5LHB]; Matt Zapotosky, Nine More Women Say Judge
Subjected Them to Inappropriate Behavior, Including Four Who Say He Touched or Kissed
Them, WASH. POST (Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter Zopotosky, Nine More Women],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nine-more-women-say-judge-sub
jected-them-to-inappropriate-behavior-including-four-who-say-he-touched-or-kissed-them
/2017/12/15/8729b736-e105-11e7-8679-a9728984779c_story.html (on file with the Michigan
Law Review); Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual
Misconduct, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017) [hereinafter Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court
Judge], https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/prominent-appeals-court-
judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-
2066faf731ef_story.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). As this piece was going to
publication, a former law clerk accused another federal judge, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, of se-
rious sexual harassment. See Protecting Federal Judiciary Employees from Sexual Harassment,
Discrimination, and Other Workplace Misconduct: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., and the Internet, 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony of Olivia Warren),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU03/20200213/110505/HHRG-116-JU03-Wstate-
WarrenO-20200213-U2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZA8-QRJ5].
98. See Heidi Bond, COURTNEY MILAN, http://www.courtneymilan.com/metoo
/kozinski.html [https://perma.cc/2LG9-EUYL]; Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge,
supra note 97.
99. Zapotosky, Nine More Women, supra note 97.
100. Dahlia Lithwick, He Made Us All Victims and Accomplices, SLATE (Dec. 13, 2017,
3:11 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/judge-alex-kozinski-made-us-all-
victims-and-accomplices.html [https://perma.cc/9UY3-8FQB].
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attorneys wearing push-up bras,101 and asking a law clerk what single girls in
San Francisco do for sex.102 Before the judicial misconduct investigation into
his actions began, Kozinski retired, which ended the judiciary’s jurisdiction
to investigate the allegations against him.103
Judge Kozinski sat on the court of appeals for thirty-two years and over
the course of those years authored or joined numerous decisions.104 Did his
alleged behavior and worldview influence the legal decisions he made in
matters related to reproductive rights and justice? Judge Kozinski sat on the
panel that concluded, over a dissent, that the Postal Service had not mishan-
dled Melody Swenson’s sexual harassment claim.105 He also authored the de-
cision in Brooks v. City of San Mateo, which held that it did not constitute
sexual harassment for a coworker to force his hand up the plaintiff’s sweater
and grab her breast.106 The then-judge wrote: “No reasonable woman in
Brooks’s position would believe that Selvaggio’s misconduct had permanent-
ly altered the terms or conditions of her employment . . . . Brooks was har-
assed on a single occasion for a matter of minutes in a way that did not
impair her ability to do her job . . . .”107 (Would she be unreasonable to think
that it did?)
The case of Judge Kozinski is also revealing because of what it suggests
about who is empowered to shape the law on matters related to reproductive
rights and justice. The former law clerk who alleged that Judge Kozinski
showed her pornography in his office wrote about how her experience in
that clerkship affected her subsequent career decisions. The former clerk
took herself out of consideration from two schools when she was on the aca-
101. See Joanna Grossman (@JoannaGrossman), TWITTER (Dec. 9, 2017, 12:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/JoannaGrossman/status/939542418638147584 [https://perma.cc/8XX8-
XQ6F] (“When I clerked on the Ninth Circuit, Kozinski sent a memo to all the judges suggest-
ing that a rule prohibiting female attorneys from wearing push-up bras would be more effec-
tive than the newly convened Gender Bias Task Force. His disrespect for women is legend-
legendary.”).
102. Nancy Rapoport, There Are Likely Several More Stories to Come, NANCY
RAPOPORT’S BLOG (Dec. 9, 2017), https://nancyrapoports.blog/2017/12/09/there-are-likely-
several-more-stories-to-come/ [https://perma.cc/9VWF-S6KZ].
103. See Matt Zapotosky, Judiciary Closes Investigation of Sexual Misconduct Allegations
Against Retired Judge Alex Kozinski, WASH. POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/world/national-security/judiciary-closes-investigation-of-sexual-misconduct-allegations-
against-retired-judge-alex-kozinski/2018/02/05/e3a94bb8-0ac0-11e8-95a5-c396801049ef
_story.html (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
104. See Niraj Chokshi, Federal Judge Alex Kozinski Retires Abruptly After Sexual Har-
assment Allegations, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us
/alex-kozinski-retires.html [https://perma.cc/SDW9-3RQS].
105. Sam Sankar, Judge Kozinski’s Opinion in This 2001 Sexual Harassment Case Is Even
More Alarming Now, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2017, 8:04 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2017/12/judge-alex-kozinskis-opinion-in-a-2001-sexual-harassment-case-is-alarming
.html [https://perma.cc/7F43-3ZEV].
106. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2000).
107. Id. at 924–26.
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demic job market, and she later chose to leave the academy and law entire-
ly.108
Another former law clerk of Judge Kozinski, by contrast, maintained a
close relationship with the judge. This former clerk stayed connected to the
Judge.109 Judge Kozinski helped this former clerk get a clerkship with a judge
who Judge Kozinski had previously clerked for—Justice Anthony M. Kenne-
dy on the U.S. Supreme Court.110 When this former clerk was nominated to
a judgeship on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Judge
Kozinski introduced him at his confirmation hearing.111 And when Justice
Kennedy retired from the Supreme Court, this man replaced him.112
That man, of course, is now Justice Brett Kavanaugh. During his short
time on the Supreme Court (and during his tenure on the court of appeals),
Justice Kavanaugh has provided a clear picture of the kind of Justice he will
be on reproductive rights and justice.113 In his confirmation hearings, then-
Judge Kavanaugh was questioned about the Supreme Court’s decision in Ei-
senstadt v. Baird.114 Eisenstadt invalidated a Connecticut law that made it a
crime to prescribe certain forms of contraception to unmarried couples.115
When asked whether he agreed with the decision in that case, then-Judge
108. See Bond, supra note 98.
109. Ryan J. Foley & Curt Anderson, Kavanaugh’s Ties to Disgraced Mentor Loom over
Confirmation, AP (Aug. 29, 2018), https://apnews.com/e37ba9bc11014b72a5db6f926f80eb42
[https://perma.cc/2JWH-NJY4].
110. Id.; Hon. Alex Kozinski, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc.org/contributors/alex-
kozinski [https://perma.cc/YP6S-D4M8].
111. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh to Be Circuit Judge for
the District of Columbia Circuit Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006),
https://www.congress.gov/109/chrg/shrg27916/CHRG-109shrg27916.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CP94-UR4K].
112. Current Members, supra note 5. He was confirmed after being accused of attempted
sexual assault and sexual assault in high school and college. See Emma Brown, California Pro-
fessor, Writer of Confidential Brett Kavanaugh Letter, Speaks Out About Her Allegation of Sex-
ual Assault, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2018, 10:28 PM), https://washingtonpost.com
/investigations/california-professor-writer-of-confidential-brett-kavanaugh-letter-speaks-out-
about-her-allegation-of-sexual-assault/2018/09/16/46982194-b846-11e8-94eb-3bd52dfe917b
_story.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Ronan Farrow & Jane Mayer, Senate
Democrats Investigate a New Allegation of Sexual Misconduct, from Brett Kavanaugh’s College
Years, NEW YORKER (Sept. 23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/senate-
democrats-investigate-a-new-allegation-of-sexual-misconduct-from-the-supreme-court-
nominee-brett-kavanaughs-college-years-deborah-ramirez [https://perma.cc/GG3E-93TB].
113. See infra notes 146–155 and accompanying text for discussion of Garza v. Hargan.
Judge Kavanaugh was one of the two judges on the panel that would have allowed ORR to con-
tinue to delay—and quite possibly prevent—the undocumented woman in its custody from
having an abortion.
114. Ian Hanchett, Kavanaugh: White’s Griswold Concurrence ‘Persuasive’—I Agree with
Roberts and Alito on Griswold and Eisenstadt, BREITBART (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://www.breitbart.com/clips/2018/09/05/kavanaugh-whites-griswold-concurrence-persua
sive-i-agree-with-roberts-and-alito-on-griswold-and-eisenstadt/ [https://perma.cc/A8AM-
YM2E]; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
115. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 454–55.
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Kavanaugh said he had no quarrel with Justice White’s concurrence.116 Jus-
tice White would not have held that unmarried persons have a constitutional
right to access contraception.117 Rather, he would have invalidated the de-
fendant’s conviction on the ground that the state had not proven the defend-
ant was unmarried.118
Several months after his confirmation, Justice Kavanaugh voted to allow
Louisiana to enforce a law regulating abortion providers that was identical to
a law the Supreme Court had invalidated just two years earlier in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.119 The case, June Medical Services v. Gee, in-
volves a Louisiana law that requires abortion providers to obtain admitting
privileges at hospitals within thirty miles of where they perform abortions.120
In Hellerstedt, the Court invalidated that same law when Texas enacted it,
finding that there was no evidence that an admitting privileges requirement
would have helped any woman anywhere in the country, which includes
Louisiana.121
The point about Judge Kozinski’s legacy is not whether Justice Ka-
vanaugh knew or should have known about Judge Kozinski’s inappropriate
behavior (though that is a fair question). It is, instead, about how (alleged)
sexual harassment and other forms of sex discrimination will affect who gets
to be in a position to shape the law and regulation of reproductive rights and
reproductive justice.122 It is about whether the law on reproductive rights
and justice is so thoroughly enmeshed and influenced by sexual misconduct
and other forms of misogyny that it is, in part, a product of them.
116. See Hanchett, supra note 114; see Kavanaugh Responses to Questions for the Record:
Hearing on the Nomination of the Honorable Brett Kavanaugh to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary 10, 115th Cong. (2018)
(questions of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
117. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 460–65 (White, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 464–65.
119. See June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663, 663 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dis-
senting); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
120. June Med. Servs., 139 S. Ct. at 663 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); June Med. Servs. LLC
v. Kliebert, 158 F. Supp. 3d 473, 484 (M.D. La. 2016).
121. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2310–14.
122. There are other related aspects to the story as well, such as the rest of the federal ju-
diciary’s response to accusations of sexual misconduct against one of its own. See Nancy
Gertner, Sexual Harassment and the Bench, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2018),
https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2018/06/71-Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-
Gertner-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G67M-GB7P]; Elie Mystal, Ineffectual Judicial Response to
#MeToo Will Continue, ABOVE L. (Apr. 10, 2019, 4:25 PM), https://abovethelaw.com
/2019/04/ineffectual-judicial-response-to-metoo-will-continue/ [https://perma.cc/6PR4-
V7ST]; Elie Mystal, John Roberts Praises Efforts to Rid Judiciary of Sexual Misconduct, Ignores
Sexual Misconduct of His Colleagues, ABOVE L. (Jan. 2, 2019, 1:33 PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2019/01/john-roberts-praises-efforts-to-rid-judiciary-of-sexual-
misconduct-ignores-sexual-misconduct-of-his-colleagues/ [https://perma.cc/V8WH-NTT3].
See generallyMACKINNON, supra note 96; MacKinnon, supra note 96.
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II. RECENTERINGCOURTS
The volume’s second stated goal is to “narrate the cases in ways that de-
center courts” (p. 1). The essays do this by “tell[ing] their stories using a
wide-lens perspective that illuminates the complex ways law is forged and
debated in social movements, in representative government, and in courts”
(p. 1).
There is much to be said about the volume’s approach to reproductive
rights and justice. Courts are led by judges, and judges are people, so it is
important to acknowledge that judges are influenced by the forces that influ-
ence people, such as organizing and social movements.123 It is also important
to emphasize the actual people who are affected by judicial decisions. And it
is likewise important to point out that legal protections such as 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012) or 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012) are often created outside of
courts. This emphasis may seem especially warranted now, given that the
changing composition of the federal courts will make the federal courts a
less-than-friendly place for reproductive rights and justice.124
In this Part, however, I want to bring out another point that is merely
implicit in the volume—a point that the volume occasionally mentions, ra-
ther than uses as a frame for the entire collection. That point is about the
importance of courts. Despite the collection’s goal of decentering courts, the
volume provides a significant amount of evidence that suggests the courts
are essential to reproductive rights and justice. Indeed, the volume’s efforts
to humanize the judicial decisions and identify the real lives that are affected
by the decisions only underscore the importance of courts.
123. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional Change, Courts, and Social Movements,
111 MICH. L. REV. 877 (2013) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION:
POLITICAL FAITH IN ANUNJUSTWORLD (2011)).
124. Some of the president’s nominees to the lower federal courts have been subject to
criticism from Republican senators for not being pro-life enough or for not being obviously
hostile enough to abortion. See Annie Karni & Maggie Haberman, Senator Josh Hawley Raises
Questions About Neomi Rao’s Abortion Stance, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/us/politics/josh-hawley-neomi-rao-abortion.html [https://perma.cc
/2N8M-YLEQ]; Seung Min Kim, Two GOP Senators Said to Express Concerns over Trump’s
Nominee for Appeals Court, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2019, 10:29 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/two-gop-senators-said-to-express-concerns-over-
trumps-nominee-for-appeals-court/2019/02/26/5dcabe0a-3a30-11e9-b786-d6abcbcd212a
_story.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review); Marianne LeVine, GOP Sen. Hawley
Presses Trump’s Judicial Pick to Clarify Abortion Stance, POLITICO (Feb. 26, 2019, 1:16 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/26/hawley-rao-abortion-1187923 [https://perma.cc
/F52S-4QVR]; Anna North,What a Republican Fight over Brett Kavanaugh’s Replacement Says
About the Abortion Debate Today, VOX (Feb. 28, 2019, 1:37 PM),
https://www.vox.com/2019/2/27/18243090/neomi-rao-dc-circuit-josh-hawley-abortion
[https://perma.cc/369C-ZV92].
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A. Courts as Sword
Some of the pieces in the volume highlight the statutory protections for
reproductive rights and justice such as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
and the Family and Medical Leave Act. These essays advance the volume’s
suggestion that courts are not sufficient to secure reproductive rights and
justice. But the essays also quietly imply that courts are probably necessary to
achieve reproductive rights and justice because they highlight how courts
can defang democratically enacted protections.
Take Shaw’s essay on Young (Chapter 10) or Bagenstos’s essay on Hibbs
(Chapter 9). Young involved a question about the proper interpretation of
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, whereas Hibbs involved a constitutional
question about the validity of the family care provisions of the Family and
Medical Leave Act.125 The question in Young was whether an employee
could establish a triable issue of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy
when her employer offered accommodations to employees who had similar
work limitations that were not attributable to pregnancy.126 By a vote of 6–3,
the Court said yes.127 Hibbs addressed whether Congress could constitution-
ally hold the states liable for violating the FMLA provision that required em-
ployers to offer their employees time off to care for family members.128
Again by a vote of 6–3, the Court said yes.129
These cases illustrate that courts can defang democratically enacted pro-
tections for reproductive rights and justice either by narrowly interpreting
statutory protections or by invalidating them. The Court didn’t ultimately
pull the trigger and gut the PDA in Young or the FMLA in Hibbs, but in each
case, three justices would have.
There are, however, several recent cases in which a majority of the Court
has limited the reach of democratically enacted protections for reproductive
rights and justice. Take two statutory interpretation cases decided in 2013. In
Vance v. Ball State University, the Court ruled, 5–4, that a “supervisor” for
purposes of Title VII liability means a person who is empowered to take tan-
gible employment actions (such as hiring or firing) against the victim, and
not a person who, for example, directs the victim’s daily work activities.130
Under Title VII, if the harasser-employee is the victim’s coworker, the em-
ployer is liable for the harassment if the employer was negligent in control-
125. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2015); Nev. Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725–26 (2003).
126. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1343–44.
127. Id. at 1343–44.
128. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721.
129. Id. at 723–25.
130. See 570 U.S. 421 (2013). Vance addressed harassment on the basis of race, but the
rule is applicable to sexual harassment cases because the Court derived its interpretation of
“supervisor” from its previous holdings in sexual harassment cases. Id. at 436–37.
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ling working conditions; if the harasser-employee is a supervisor, however,
the employer is strictly liable.131
The decision in Vance limited the scope of employers’ liability for sexual
harassment and sexual discrimination and reduced employers’ incentives to
proactively deal with sexual harassment and discrimination. Justice Gins-
burg’s dissent argued that the decision “ignores the conditions under which
members of the work force labor, and disserves the objective of Title VII to
prevent discrimination from infecting the Nation’s workplaces.”132 As she
explained, the Court’s ruling would limit an employer’s liability in a case
where an employee “punish[ed] [other employee]s who would not date him
with full-time toilet-cleaning duty” at work.133 She continued: “A supervisor
with authority to control subordinates’ daily work is no less aided in his har-
assment than is a supervisor with authority to fire, demote, or transfer.”134
The other case, University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nas-
sar, held that in order to make out a retaliation claim under Title VII, a
plaintiff must demonstrate that her allegation of harassment was the “but-
for” cause of the retaliation, rather than just a “motivating factor” behind the
retaliation.135 That 5–4 decision also limited the scope of employers’ liability
under Title VII, including where an employer retaliated against workers who
bring sex discrimination or sexual harassment to the attention of their em-
ployers.136 Again in dissent, Justice Ginsburg wrote that “ ‘fear of retaliation
is the leading reason why people stay silent’ about . . . discrimination.”137 She
ended her dissent with this warning about the Court’s ruling:
Senator Case, a prime sponsor of Title VII, commented that a “sole cause”
standard would render the Act “totally nugatory.” Life does not shape up
that way, the Senator suggested, commenting “[i]f anyone ever had an ac-
tion that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind of animal
from any I know of.”138
The importance of courts to securing reproductive rights and justice is
also reflected in the federal courts’ willingness to invalidate democratically
enacted protections for reproductive justice. In recent years, courts have
wielded the First Amendment against such statutory protections. Take the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in NIFLA v. Becerra, which invalidated a
131. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789–90 (1998). There is an affirma-
tive defense that is available under certain conditions. Id. at 805.
132. Vance, 570 U.S. at 451 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 457. Justice Ginsburg drew these facts from an actual case. See Faragher, 524
U.S. at 780.
134. Vance, 570 U.S. at 457–58 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
135. See 570 U.S. 338 (2013).
136. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 570 U.S. at 362. The decision in that case was specifi-
cally about retaliation for making a racial and religious discrimination claim. Id. at 345.
137. Id. at 363 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
& Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271, 279 (2009)).
138. Id. at 385 (citations omitted) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 13,837 (1964)).
April 2020] Redefining Reproductive Rights and Justice 1121
California law that required crisis pregnancy centers to disclose public fund-
ing options for abortion and required unlicensed crisis pregnancy centers to
disclose that they were unlicensed.139 The California law sought to address
the burdens that crisis pregnancy centers impose on women, particularly
women in marginalized communities, when the centers do not inform wom-
en of all of their available health care options.140 The Court held that the First
Amendment prohibited the California legislature from enacting these pro-
tections.141
Before NIFLA, there was Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and other related cas-
es.142 There, employers sought a First Amendment exemption from the stat-
utory requirement to fill out some forms that would have allowed their
employees to obtain health insurance coverage for contraception from an
insurance provider.143 The employers had already succeeded in preventing
the government from requiring the employers themselves to provide the
contraception coverage through their designated insurance providers.144
Here too, the courts are undoing democratically enacted protections for re-
productive rights and justice.
These cases make clear that even if reproductive justice supporters and
advocates obtain protections in representative government, they need to be
able to protect those victories in the courts. Deemphasizing courts risks ig-
noring that reality and minimizing its threat.
B. Courts as Shield
Reproductive justice supporters will not always secure protections from
representative governments even though a majority of the country supports
women’s access to contraception and abortion.145 Over the last few years,
courts have proven to be important shields from draconian restrictions on
reproductive rights and justice.
139. Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369–70 (2018).
140. For a critique of the decision, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Consti-
tutional Gerrymandering Against Abortion Rights: NIFLA v. Becerra, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 61, 63–
64 (2019).
141. NIFLA, 138 S. Ct. at 2378.
142. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); see Wheaton Coll. v. Bur-
well, 573 U.S. 958 (2014).
143. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682;Wheaton College, 573 U.S. 958.
144. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 736.
145. See Gretchen Frazee, New Abortion Laws Are Too Extreme for Most Americans, Poll
Shows, PBS NEWSHOUR (June 7, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/new-
abortion-laws-are-too-extreme-for-most-americans-poll-shows [https://perma.cc/A9YN-
MKTQ]; Public Opinion on Abortion, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.pewforum
.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/SL8X-6SL3]; see also Where the
Public Stands on Religious Liberty Vs. Nondiscrimination: 4. Very Few Americans See Contra-
ception as Morally Wrong, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.pewforum.org/2016
/09/28/4-very-few-americans-see-contraception-as-morally-wrong/ [https://perma.cc/WG68-
YR5H].
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Take Garza v. Hargan, the case about the Office of Refugee Resettle-
ment’s treatment of undocumented minor women in its custody.146 ORR as-
serted that it could prevent (or perhaps just delay) the undocumented minor
women in its legal custody from having abortions.147 ORR maintained that
its director had the power to determine that having an abortion was not in
the women’s best interests.148 A state court had already concluded that the
women were competent to decide on their own whether to end their preg-
nancies.149 ORR alternatively insisted that it could further delay the women’s
ability to have an abortion while it continued to search for a private sponsor
to take custody of the young women.150 ORR’s search for a private sponsor
had already pushed the women from the first to the second trimester.151 ORR
also argued that it could prevent or delay the women from having abortions
because it did not want to be “complicit” in their abortions by continuing to
offer the young women medical care after they received abortions.152
Initially, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit allowed ORR to
delay (and possibly prevent) the young women from having abortions on the
ground that putting the women in the custody of private sponsors (and in-
definitely delaying their abortions in the process) would put the women in a
“better place.”153 There was no evidence for this hypothesis, and Judge Mil-
lett issued a fierce dissent from that opinion.154 ORR was not, however, able
to carry out its plans because a majority of judges on the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the D.C. Circuit intervened and vacated the panel opinion, largely
for the reasons that Judge Millett gave in her dissent.155
That decision underscores the importance of courts to reproductive
rights and justice. But the decision also underscores that it is important to
146. See 874 F.3d 735, 738 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Millett, J., concurring), vacated sub nom.
Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018).
147. See Marty Lederman, Return to Garza: How ORR Is Acting Without Statutory Au-
thority (and Why DOJ’s Arguments Haven’t Gotten Any Better Since Last Year),
BALKINIZATION (Sept. 24, 2018), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/09/return-to-garza-how-
orr-is-acting.html [https://perma.cc/WLM5-WRD4]; Marty Lederman, The SG’s Remarkable
Cert. Petition in Hargan v. Garza, the “Jane Doe” Abortion Case, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 8,
2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/the-sgs-remarkable-cert-petition-in.html [https://
perma.cc/VCL9-CRX3].
148. See Garza, 874 F.3d at 741.
149. Id. at 736.
150. Id. at 738.
151. See Garza, 138 S. Ct. at 1790; Garza, 874 F.3d at 736, 741.
152. See Garza, 874 F.3d at 740–41; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Garza, 138 S. Ct.
1790 (No. 17-654); Marty Lederman, Lawless and Cruel: The HHS Abortion Scandal That’s Fly-
ing Under the Radar, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 21, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot
.com/2017/12/lawless-and-cruel-hhs-abortion-scandal.html [https://perma.cc/Q53D-N7UM].
153. Garza, 874 F.3d at 755; Garza v. Hargan, No. 17-5236, 2017 WL 9854555, at *1 (D.C.
Cir. Oct. 20, 2017), vacated in part on reh’g en banc, 874 F.3d 735 (D.C. Cir. 2017), vacated sub
nom. Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790 (2018).
154. Garza, 2017 WL 9854555, at *1 (Millett, J., dissenting).
155. Garza, 874 F.3d at 736.
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reproductive rights and justice to recognize—and make painfully clear—that
courts are important. Many of the judges on the D.C. Circuit, including
Judge Millett herself, were on the D.C. Circuit only because Senate Demo-
crats fought to fill several vacancies on the court after Republican senators
slow walked and stonewalled President Obama’s judicial nominations.156
Democratic Senators responded to then-Minority Leader McConnell’s tac-
tics by abolishing the filibuster for lower-court nominations, which is how
Judge Millett got confirmed to the D.C. Circuit (along with several of the
other judges in the en banc majority).157
Garza is a powerful example of why the courts were—and are—worth
focusing on.158 The decision ended up preventing the federal government
from barricading a woman indoors so she could not have an abortion.159
Courts may not be able to—and should not be able to—enact sweeping
changes to society or government. But they can still make an enormous dif-
ference to people’s lives, including in the field of reproductive rights and jus-
tice.
* * *
The edited collection contains essays that include details or observations
that imply that courts have an important role to play in reproductive rights
and reproductive justice. Cary Franklin’s essay on Whole Woman’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, for example, notes how upholding the Texas law in Hellerstedt
would have allowed states to overregulate abortion providers out of existence
(Franklin, p. 227). And Neil Siegel’s essay on Struck contains a remarkable
156. See Ailsa Chang, Republicans Push Back on Obama’s D.C. Court Nominees, NPR
(Sept. 19, 2013, 5:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/2013/09/19/224133307/republicans-push-back-
on-obamas-d-c-court-nominees [https://perma.cc/URB5-A9FH]; Burgess Everett & Seung
Min Kim, Judge Not: GOP Blocks Dozens of Obama Court Picks, POLITICO (July 6, 2015, 5:13
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/07/payback-gop-blocks-obama-judge-picks-judicia
ry-119743 [https://perma.cc/5877-KYZF]; Jeremy W. Peters, Obama Pick for Court is 3rd in a
Row Blocked by Republicans, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/us/politics/republicans-block-another-obama-nominee-
for-key-judgeship.html [https://perma.cc/8ENL-G6F8].
157. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters
on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013, 1:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-
precedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html (on file with the
Michigan Law Review); Tom McCarthy, Senate Approves Change to Filibuster Rule After Re-
peated Republican Blocks, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2013/nov/21/harry-reid-senate-rules-republican-filibusters-nominations [https://
perma.cc/62CC-LTDH]; Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibus-
ter, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/us/politics/reid-sets-in-
motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html [https://perma.cc/TB6H-A3R3].
158. One of the women ORR sought to prevent from having an abortion was a rape vic-
tim who indicated she would harm herself if she could not have an abortion. See Lederman,
supra note 152.
159. See Garza, 874 F.3d at 738–40.
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excerpt from the district judge’s ruling that sheds some light on the im-
portance of judicial attitudes toward reproductive rights and justice. In a rul-
ing from the bench in favor of the Air Force, the judge said “[s]omebody said
that [women are a little more difficult when they are pregnant than when
they are not], that there is some change in their personality, and their capa-
bilities. It could well be that the Air Force felt that when they formulated
their policy and rules.”160 And the introduction to the volume suggests that
courts are important to reproductive rights and justice when it notes that
there will be consequences for reproductive rights from Justice Kavanaugh’s
confirmation to the Supreme Court (p. 2).
But when courts are so much a part of the current war on reproductive
justice, it may be time to make explicit that courts are important to repro-
ductive rights and justice and to convey to those who are interested in re-
productive justice that the courts are worth focusing on and fighting for.
Parts of the volume seem to imply that courts do more following than
leading with respect to reproductive rights and justice. That is, perhaps
courts are not unimportant to reproductive rights and justice per se; they
just merely follow the lead of other actors—be it political movements, social
organizing, or the political branches.161 But some of the preceding examples
complicate this conception of courts. Consider, for example, the decisions
that narrowly interpreted the scope of laws remedying sexual harassment.162
In those cases, it is hard to identify a particular social movement or political
organization motivating those decisions.
Or consider the decisions on abortion or contraception. One function of
early dissents on those issues (as well as more recent ones) is to inject certain
ideas into the conversation on abortion and contraception and in particular
into the social movements and organizing about them. That is part of what
Justice Thomas accomplished in his separate writing in Box v. Planned
Parenthood, which argued that modern-day abortion and contraception have
their origins in the eugenics movement.163 After his concurrence, people
started talking about possible connections between abortion, contraception,
and eugenics.164 That was one function of earlier dissents on abortion as
well—those writings reinforced the political movements and social networks
160. Siegel, p. 35 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 35 n.29, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S.
1071 (1972) (No. 72-178)).
161. See, e.g., Dinner, p. 79; Mayeri, p. 137–38.
162. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013); SPERINO &
THOMAS, supra note 73, at 125–26; Clarke, supra note 74, at 540–42.
163. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782–93 (2019)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
164. E.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Why Clarence Thomas Is Trying to Bring Eugenics into the
Abortion Debate, SLATE (June 17, 2019, 10:42 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2019/06/clarence-thomas-eugenics-abortion-debate-roe-v-wade.html [https://perma
.cc/Y6XD-CR4S]; Jason L. Riley, Opinion, Justice Thomas on Abortion and Eugenics, WSJ (June
4, 2019, 6:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-thomas-on-abortion-and-eugenics-
11559687789 (on file with theMichigan Law Review).
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that, in turn, garnered support for judicial nominations that were aimed at
overturning Roe.165 One of the volume’s editors, Reva Siegel, has written
about how theories of judicial decisionmaking such as originalism, when
they are articulated by the courts, provide organizing points for political ac-
tors and political movements.166 Courts, in other words, can be change
agents and leaders as well as followers.
CONCLUSION
There is so much to like in the edited collection that perhaps future vol-
umes will be longer. This Review has offered some possible ways in which
the collection could be expanded, but there are others too.
For example, it might be worth thinking about how women are treated
when they seek out reproductive health care. Journalists uncovered how the
University of Southern California kept an OBGYN on staff—and allowed
him to continue seeing patients—after there were multiple allegations that
he harassed female patients in the course of exams, including by taking na-
ked pictures of them.167 And recent law reform work has brought attention
to the phenomenon of medical students performing “practice” gynecological
exams on women who were sedated for other surgical procedures and did
not consent to the exams.168
Did these practices shape some women’s decisions about whether to
have children? The volume is right to call attention to the many ways that
law and society shape decisions about parentage and sex. But there are other
pockets of law and society that also influence sex and parentage decisions
beyond what the volume covered. By underscoring how workplace policies
and criminal justice issues influence parentage decisions just as access to
abortion and contraception do, the volume opens up the conversation on re-
productive rights and justice to examine other influences on parentage deci-
165. See, e.g., STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT:
THE BATTLE FORCONTROL OF THE LAW (2008); T.R. Goldman, The Flower of the Reagan Revo-
lution, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1, 2005, at 10; Steven M. Teles, Transformative Bureaucracy:
Reagan’s Lawyers and the Dynamics of Political Investment, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61 (2009);
Judge Scalia’s Cheerleaders, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 1986, at B6.
166. E.g., Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006).
167. See Harriet Ryan et al., Must Reads: A USC Doctor Was Accused of Bad Behavior
with Young Women for Years. The University Let Him Continue Treating Students, L.A. TIMES
(May 16, 2018, 6:25 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-usc-doctor-
misconduct-complaints-20180515-story.html [https://perma.cc/3MN2-LPUX]; Mihir Zaveri,
50 More Women Sue U.S.C. as Accusations of Gynecologist’s Abuse Pile Up, N.Y. TIMES (July 25,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/usc-gynecologist-george-tyndall-lawsuit.html
[https://perma.cc/3F6G-FE5Z].
168. See Phoebe Friesen, Educational Pelvic Exams on Anesthetized Women: Why Con-
sent Matters, 32 BIOETHICS 298 (2018); Paul Hsieh, Pelvic Exams on Anesthetized Women
Without Consent: A Troubling and Outdated Practice, FORBES (May 14, 2018, 9:20 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulhsieh/2018/05/14/pelvic-exams-on-anesthetized-women-
without-consent-a-troubling-and-outdated-practice/ [https://perma.cc/BY6W-AJQH].
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sions. And despite its approach of decentering courts, the implication of the
volume is that courts play an important role in constructing and reinforcing
the law on reproductive rights and justice, which influences culture and so-
cial norms too.
